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Abatement and Transaction Costs of Carbon-Sink Projects Involving
Smallholders
Summary
Agroforestry projects have the potential to help mitigate global warming by acting as
sinks for greenhouse gasses. However, participation in carbon-sink projects may be
constrained by high costs. This problem may be particularly severe for projects
involving smallholders in developing countries. Of particular concern are the
transaction costs incurred in developing projects, measuring, certifying and selling the
carbon-sequestration services generated by such projects. This paper addresses these
issues by analysing the implications of transaction and abatement costs in carbonsequestration projects. A model of project participation is developed, which accounts
for the conditions under which both buyers and sellers would be willing to engage in a
carbon transaction that involves a long-term commitment. The model is used to identify
critical project-design variables (minimum project size, farm price of carbon, minimum
area of participating farms). A project feasibility frontier (PFF) is derived, which shows
the minimum project size that is feasible for any given market price of carbon. The PFF
is used to analyse how the transaction costs imposed by the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol affect project feasibility.
Keywords: Agroforestry, Climate Policy, Carbon Sequestration Costs
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1. Introduction
Concerns over global warming have led to the establishment of markets for greenhouse gas
emissions. The most common greenhouse gas, and the main gas emitted by burning fossil
fuels, is carbon dioxide (CO2). Carbon trading has grown significantly since the Kyoto
Protocol was ratified, reaching a value of US$10 billion in 2005 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006).
Most transactions have occurred within the European Union Emission Trading Scheme.
However, the focus of this study is Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which has the purpose of assisting developing countries to achieve
sustainable development while contributing to meet the emission-reduction commitments
agreed upon by Annex I countries1. The medium of exchange under this Article is the CER
(Certified Emission Reduction), measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalents (CO2e).
The demand for CERs will be met mostly by the energy sector, through clean technologies.
However, tree-based systems also have a role to play, as they are a convenient way of
reducing net emissions by sequestering CO2 from the atmosphere through the process of
photosynthesis. Under the current rules of the CDM afforestation and reforestation (AR) are
the only allowable means of sequestering carbon. CERS are awarded for AR activities that
generate sequestration additional to a baseline (or business as usual) estimate. AR projects in
tropical countries may involve participation of smallholders and communities or they may be
based on industrial plantations. Smallholder projects consist of activities undertaken by
farmers who manage small land areas and whose production system may be a mix of
subsistence and marketable crops. Industrial plantations generally consist of monoculture of
commercial trees for timber, pulp or fruit production.
There is much interest in the development and environmental communities in the potential for
small-scale carbon projects to simultaneously contribute to rural development and climate
change mitigation. However high transactions costs associated with smallholder participation
is a major barrier to be overcome. In this paper we present an economic model of the
decision to participate in carbon sequestration projects from both a buyer and seller
perspective, including the impact of transactions costs. In the following section we lay out
basic economic issues in carbon sequestration supply and transactions costs, followed by a
model of project participation for buyers and sellers. Section 4 includes a discussion of how
key model parameters are constructed, including sequestration rates and payments, abatement
costs and transactions costs. In section 5 the simulation model is presented with the results
shown in section 6. Section 7 presents the concept of the project feasibility frontier and
sensitivity analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of means to facilitate the
feasibility of smallholder carbon projects based on model results, and a discussion of future
possible extensions of the model.

2. Carbon Sequestration Supply and Transactions Costs
Carbon sequestration projects differ in terms of cost per unit of carbon emissions avoided or
carbon sequestered, determined by the opportunity costs of switching land uses.They also
differ in terms of other environmental and social benefits provided. For example, a complex
1

Annex I countries include the OECD countries (except Mexico and Turkey) and transition economies in
eastern Europe. The US and Australia did not ratify the Protocol and the bulk of demand for carbon credits
comes from Europe and Japan.
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agroforest may represent an efficient use of family labour, provide sustenance and contain
higher biodiversity than a monoculture of a fast-growing tree species. A large-scale
monoculture plantation, on the other hand, may accumulate more carbon and provide
employment, but it may provide little biodiversity and social benefits besides employment.
These issues need to be considered by host countries when designing policies to encourage
the adoption of carbon-sequestration projects that also provide environmental and social
benefits.
The supply of CERs depends on availability and costs of different technologies and resource
endowments, and these will be partly determined by location. In Figure 1 the potential supply
function in the absence of transaction costs (SA) represents the marginal abatement costs of
providing different cumulative levels of emission reductions.
For a given supply function, as determined by current technology and land availability, the
equilibrium levels of price and quantity (QA, PA) depend on the demand function (D). The
curve SA shows the prices that would be required to motivate different levels of abatement, or
mitigation, in a world of zero transaction costs, where supply decisions depend simply on
abatement costs.
ST

P ($)

CT

SA

PT
PA

D
QT

QA

Q (CERs)

Figure 1. The market for CERs and the role of transaction costs

In order to receive certification and enter the CER market, a project will have to incur various
transaction costs in showing that it is reducing net emissions (e.g. increasing net
sequestration). Carbon sequestered and stored in agroforestry projects needs to be accounted
for in a way that ensures the carbon changes are real, directly attributable to the project, and
additional to any changes that would have occurred in the absence of the project. Transaction
costs (CT) make the supply function shift up and to the left (from SA to ST in Figure 1), hence
reducing the size of the market. The new equilibrium point (QT, PT) represents a lower
quantity of CERs at a higher price compared to the original equilibrium (QA, PA). If the
transaction costs are too high, the market will not develop at all. This study focuses on the
supply side of the market and concentrates on agroforestry projects involving smallholders.

3. A Model of Project Participation Including Transactions Costs
Consider a project composed of one buyer and many sellers. The Buyer is an NGO (the
project proponent) and the Sellers are smallholders. The Sellers are paid for adopting
2
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agroforestry land uses that sequester carbon above a baseline. The Buyer purchases these
carbon offsets and sells them in the CER market. So the Buyer acts as an intermediary
between the smallholders and the international carbon market.
For simplicity, define a representative farmer with a given farm area a and current land use,
call this the ‘average’ seller and assume there are n identical sellers. The representative seller
will participate in the project if the reward received for carbon sequestration (vC) is larger
than the opportunity cost of switching land uses (the abatement cost, vA) plus the transaction
cost of participating in the project (vT), The condition for seller participation is:
v C > v A + vT

(1)

with the three variables measured in terms of present value. The present value of carbon
payments received by the seller is:

vC = a ∑ Ct p F (1 + δ s )

−t

(2)

t

where Ct represents the expected stock of carbon above the baseline per hectare of land in
year t, pF is the farm price of carbon and δS is the Seller’s discount rate. The abatement cost to
the Seller is:

v A = a ∑ Rt (1 + δ s )

−t

(3)

t

Where Rt represents the opportunity cost experienced in year t as a result of having switched
land use to a tree-based system in year zero. The transaction cost experienced by the seller is
the discounted sum of a stream of annual transaction costs (qt):
vT = ∑ qt (1 + δ s )

−t

(4)

t

Now consider the Buyer. The Buyer will implement a project if the present value of carbon
payments received in the CER market (VC) is at least equal to the present value of payments
to smallholders (the abatement cost to the buyer, VA) plus the transaction costs of designing
and implementing the project (VT). The condition for Buyer participation is:
VC ≥ V A + VT

(5)

VC is the discounted sum of payments obtained by accumulating the carbon offsets produced
by all landholders in the project, certifying them and selling them in the CER market:
VC = n ⋅ a ∑ pC Ct (1 + δ B )

−t

(6)

t

where pC is the rental price per tonne of carbon and δB is the Buyer’s discount rate. The
abatement and transaction costs for the Buyer are, respectively:

3
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V A = n ⋅ a ∑ p F Ct (1 + δ B )

(7)

VT = ∑ Qt (1 + δ B )

(8)

−t

t

−t

t

where Qt represent the annual transaction costs. The Buyer must set the farm price of carbon
(pF) at a level that satisfies conditions (1) and (5). This decision is influenced by the size of
the project and the number of participants, as explained later.

4. Constructing key parameters in the model
A. Projecting carbon sequestration rates and payments

The carbon emission reduction available for credits in a given year (Ct) is only the amount of
carbon sequestered under the project that is above the baselineThat is, only the ‘additional’
emissions reductions relative to the business-as-usual scenario are eligible. In any given year:
Ct = C P ,t − CC ,t

(9)

Where CP,t and CC,t are the expected carbon stocks in the proposed land use and the current
land use, respectively, in year t. If time series data on diameter and height of trees are
available for the site, the amount of carbon sequestered by aboveground biomass can be
estimated based on allometric equations (Brown, 2002). Alternatively, projections of carbon
stocks can be based on models (i.e. Wise and Cacho 2005a, 2005b).
Regarding carbon payments, to avoid the problem of permanence2 Marland et al. (2001)
propose the use of a rental price. The difference between the purchase and the rental system is
that the former represents a purchase of carbon flows with redemption of payments upon
project termination or failure (Cacho, Hean and Wise 2003), whereas the later involves a
rental of carbon stocks with no redemption of credits required. Both systems are compatible
with temporary CERs for AR projects under the CDM3, but the rental system is more
convenient for modelling purposes.
The range of farm prices (pF) that the buyer can pay is influenced by the market price of
carbon (pC). Here we express pF and pC as annual rental prices per unit of biomass carbon
stored in trees. To understand the relationship between rental prices and purchase prices
consider the present value (PV) of an asset that yields a perpetual stream of annual payments
Y discounted at rate i:
PV =

Y
1 − e −i

(10)

2

The permanence problem arises in afforestation and reforestation projects because carbon captured in trees can
be released upon harvest, in contrast with energy projects where an avoided emission is permanent.
3
A temporary CER or “tCER” is a CER issued for an AR project activity which expires at the end of the
commitment period following the one during which it was issued (UNFCCC document
FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2).

4
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In a perfect market the ratio Y/PV is equivalent to the rental price of the asset expressed as a
proportion of the asset’s value. If we let the asset be a CER (expressed as a tonne of CO2)
valued at price pCER, and consider that the process of photosynthesis converts 3.67 units of
CO2 into one unit of biomass carbon, then the rental price of biomass carbon is:

(

)

pC = 3.67 1 − e − i pCER

(11)

The value of the discount rate in the rental carbon market (i) depends on the rate of return
expected by investors. For simplicity we assume the carbon market discount rate is the same
as the Buyer’s. Therefore the value of i in (10) and (11) is calculated by converting the rate
for discrete discounting δB into a continuous rate i = ln(1+δB).
The CER price places an upper limit on the feasible farm price, because the Buyer would set
pF ≤ pC even in the absence of transaction costs. The relationship between the purchase price
and the rental price is affected not only by the discount rate but also by expected price trends.
If the price of carbon is expected to increase in the future then the rental price will be lower
than indicated by equation (11), because those renting will require a discount to forego the
option of purchasing today. Conversely, if the price of carbon is expected to decrease in the
future the rental price will be higher than indicated by equation (11).
B. Abatement Costs

Abatement costs for the Seller are defined as the costs of producing one unit of (uncertified)
carbon sequestration services, or the cost of producing one unit of biomass carbon. In any
given location, abatement costs can be estimated as the opportunity cost of undertaking a
carbon-sequestration activity rather than the most profitable alternative activity, or the cost of
switching from the previous land use to the new land use, as represented in equation (3). This
cost includes the present value of the stream of revenues foregone as a result of participating
in the project. It may also include additional risk exposure or loss of food security arising
from this participation (Cacho, Marshall and Milne 2003). If we ignore risk perceptions and
other barriers to adoption that could be overcome by participating in the project, the
opportunity cost from equation (3) is:
Rt = RC ,t − RP ,t

(12)

where RC,t and RP,t are the annual net revenues of the current land use and the proposed land
use respectively. In agroforestry systems with multiple outputs (eg. fruit, timber and spices)
the annual revenue is the sum of the revenues obtained from the different products. In a
system with J land uses and I inputs we have:
RP ,t = ∑ y j ,t p j − ∑ xi ,t ci ,
j

j ∈ (1,...,J), i ∈ (1,...,i)

(13)

i

Where, yj,t is the yield of output j in year t, pj is the price per unit of output, xj,t is the amount
of input i used in year t and ci is the cost of input i.

5
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C. Transaction Costs

Williamson (1985) distinguished the costs of contracting as ex ante and ex post transaction
costs. These correspond with activities undertaken in the processes of achieving an
agreement and then continuing to coordinate implementation of the agreement, respectively.
Stavins (1995, p. 134) stated: “transaction costs are ubiquitous in market economies and can
arise from the transfer of any property right because parties to an exchange must find one
another, communicate, and exchange information”. In the case of carbon markets transaction
costs tend to be high, because the property right to be exchanged is difficult to measure and
its exact size is subject to uncertainty.
Cacho, Marshall and Milne (2003, 2005) present a typology of transaction costs applicable to
carbon-sink projects, largely based on Dudek and Wiener (1996). Here we aggregate their
seven categories into five and distinguish between the costs borne by buyers and sellers
(Table 1).

6
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Table 1. Classification of transaction costs in AR projects for carbon sequestration
Cost type

Buyer (Q)

Seller (q)
ex ante

Search and negotiation

WS

• find sites, establish contact, organize

•
•
•
•

information sessions, draft
contracts, provide training,
promotion
establish baseline for region
estimate potential C stocks and
flows of project
design individual farm plans
produce PDD

wS

• attend information sessions
• undertake training
• design farm plan

ex ante

Approval

WA

• approval by host country (DNA)
• validate the project proposal (DOE)
• Submit to CER Board

• obtain permit

wA

ex ante

Project management

WP

wP

• buy computers and software,

• purchase tape and equipment for measuring

establish office

trees and sampling soil

• establish permanent sampling plots

ex post
• maintain database and administer

• attend regular project meetings

payments
• coordinate field crews, pay salaries
• distribute payments to landholders
• interest costs
ex post

Monitoring

WM

wM

• enter data from farmer sheets

• measure trees, fill in form and deliver to

calculate C payments

project office

• process soil C samples
• measure random sample of plots to

• sample soil C

check farmer estimates
• verification and certification of

carbon (DOE)
ex post

Enforcement and insurance

WE

wE

• maintain buffer of C
• purchase liability insurance
• settle disputes

• protect plot from poachers and fire
• participate in dispute settlement

7
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The transaction costs experienced by buyers and sellers in time period t are respectively:
Qt = WS ,t + WA,t + WP ,t + WM ,t + WE ,t

(14)

qt = wS ,t + wA,t + wP ,t + wM ,t + wE ,t

(15)

where the subscripts represent search and negotiation (S), approval (A), project management
(P), monitoring (M), and enforcement and insurance (E). Using the CDM project cycle as a
basis (Figure 2) we can relate these costs to the design and implementation of projects.
(1) PDD Development

ex ante

(2) approval by host country

(pre-implementation)

(3) validation
(4) registration
(5) monitoring
ex post
(implementation)

(6) verification + certification

t

(7) CER issuance

Figure 2. The CDM project cycle

Search and negotiation costs. The CDM project cycle starts with the preparation of a Project
Design Document (PDD). This requires the project developer to identify a suitable region;
gather agricultural, social and economic information about the region to develop the baseline;
identify suitable land uses and estimate their carbon sequestration potential; contact and
establish relationships with the local people; negotiate the terms of the project and the
schedule of payments for carbon-sequestration services; and possibly undertake
environmental and social impact studies. These activities are included within Search and
negotiation costs in Table 1. Estimates of these costs in the literature vary widely depending
on the nature of the activities within the project, the scale of the project, assumptions
regarding the presence of local NGOs and farmer groups that may facilitate the process of
contacting local people, and the availability of local experts to design the monitoring strategy
and prepare the PDD.
Approval costs. Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the CDM cycle in Figure 2 fall within the Approval costs
category. They include approval by the Designated National Authority (DNA) of the host
country; validation of the PDD by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) accredited by the
CDM Executive Board; and registration of the project when submitted to the Executive
Board. The costs of these activities depend on several factors, including the institutional
infrastructure of the host country and the availability of a local DOE that can validate the
PDD as a cheaper alternative to an international consultant.

8
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Monitoring costs. Steps 5, 6 and 7 of the CDM cycle in Figure 2 fall within the Monitoring
costs category of Table 1. These are the costs of measuring the CO2 abatement actually
achieved by the project, including certification and verification by a DOE. Once the CDM
Executive Board issues the appropriate number of CERs the project developer (the Buyer)
becomes a seller in the international carbon market. Any additional transaction costs that may
be associated with selling CERs in the international market are not accounted for below. It is
assumed that the project developer can access the full price per CER, although it is a simple
matter to reduce the price by a brokerage fee if applicable. Monitoring costs are recurrent, as
they are incurred every time a new batch of carbon is submitted for CER crediting.

Two types of transaction costs listed in Table 1 do not fit neatly within the CDM project
cycle; nonetheless they are necessary for the approval and operation of the project.
Project management costs include the cost of keeping records of project participants and
administration of payments to sellers, as well as salaries and transportation costs of project
employees. Ex ante project management activities include the establishment of a local project
office and the training of staff. Project management costs are not normally recognized
explicitly in the literature on transaction costs of Kyoto mechanisms, but they are expenses
incurred in buying and selling carbon-sequestration services, so they should be considered.
Enforcement and insurance costs arise from the risk of project failure or underperformance,
which might be caused by fire, slow tree growth, or leakage4. Enforcement costs may be
incurred in the form of litigation and dispute-resolution expenses. Insurance options may
include purchase of an insurance policy, deduction of a risk premium from the price of
carbon, and maintenance of buffer carbon stocks that are not sold. These activities form part
of the risk-management strategy required within the PDD.
D. Empirical Estimates of Transaction Costs

A review of published CDM transaction-cost estimates for small projects (Michelowa et al
2003; de Gouvello and Coto 2003; Krey 2004; EcoSecurities 2003) indicates that search and
negotiation costs (WS) range between $22,000 and $160,000; approval costs (WA) range
between $12,000 and $120,000; and monitoring costs (WM) range between $5,000 and
$270,000. Only one source (EcoSecurities) presents risk-mitigation costs (1% to 3% of
CERs), which fall under enforcement and insurance (WE). The wide range of values in all
categories illustrates the fact that transaction costs are highly sensitive to the type and size of
project assumed. In addition, since the market is very recently established, there is still
considerable variation and discussion about the rules of exchange which affect transactions
costs.
Useful information regarding transaction costs of projects involving smallholders is provided
by the Scolel Te project in Southern Mexico, which has developed a management system
called ‘Plan Vivo’. De Jong et al. (2004) outline the transaction costs associated with
designing the Plan Vivo Management System. Under the Search and negotiation category we
could include the costs of undertaking the feasibility study, the carbon inventories, the landuse analysis, and the development of the regional baseline. The total cost of these activities
was approximately $830,000. Trained technicians develop Plan Vivos in their community
4

Leakage occurs when the emissions reductions achieved in the project area are offset by an increase in
emissions outside the project boundary, leading to no net reduction in emissions (or even a net increase).
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either with individual farmers or with the community as a whole. Designing a Plan Vivo
requires about 3 days of training by a professional technician. Salary, transport and lodging,
are the main expenditures for training sessions, which typically cost between $400 and $500
each (de Jong et al. 2004).
Arifin (2005) presents estimates of the transaction costs incurred by community-based
forestry management groups in Sumber Jaya, Indonesia. Activities identified by Arifin
include obtaining information and joining farmer groups (search and negotiation); the cost of
obtaining a permit to participate (approval); the cost of attending meetings (project
management); and the costs of guarding crops and participating in dispute settlement
(enforcement and insurance). Arifin calculated these costs as the time required to perform
these activities multiplied by the wage rate.

5. Implementation of a Numerical Model for Empirical Analysis
In this section we extend our model to enable us to undertake empirical analysis of situations
in which both buyers and sellers conditions for participating in the carbon market are met,
including the effects of transactions costs as laid out above. The model, which is implemented
in the Matlab environment (The Mathworks 2000), can be solved numerically for any set of
exogenous variables. Essentially, the model consists of a set of nonlinear equations that are
solved iteratively to find combinations of variables that satisfy project-participation
constraints.
In Table 2 a list of variables and their units as defined for the model is presented, covering
various dimensions of abatement and transactions costs, returns to carbon sequestration and
other key factors that influence project feasibility.
The foregoing analysis, based on a hypothetical 25-year project, is used to identify critical
project-design variables. Prices are expressed in terms of US dollars. The baseline is assumed
to be a cassava crop with an NPV of $4,376/ha and the project activity is a damar
agroforestry system with an NPV of $4,372/ha. The damar system is a complex agroforest
developed by the Krui people of Lampung, south Sumatra. The system consists of a sequence
of crops building up to a “climax that mimics mature natural forest” (ASB 2001). The main
tree species is damar (Shorea javanica), a source of resin that provides a flow of income.
Other outputs include fruits, pepper and firewood.
The carbon stock of the baseline was assumed to be zero because cassava biomass is
harvested every year and soil carbon is not accounted for. The carbon accumulation pattern of
the damar system (Figure 3) was represented by a Gompertz equation:

C P ,t

⎛α ⎞
= β ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝β⎠

exp ( −γ ⋅t )

(16)

10
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Table 2. Variable definitions for project-participation model
Description
Units
Carbon
payments
received
by
Buyer,
Seller
$
(present
value)
VC, vC
Abatement costs experienced by Buyer, Seller
$ (present value)
VA, vA
Transaction
costs
experienced
by
Buyer,
Seller
$ (present value)
VT, vA
Carbon
stock
above
the
baseline
in
year
t
tC/ha
Ct
Carbon stock of project activity in year t
tC/ha
CP,t
Carbon
stock
of
current
activity
(baseline)
in
year
t
tC/ha
CC,t
Opportunity cost of land use change in year t
$/ha
Rt
Net
revenue
of
project
activity
in
year
t
$/ha
RP,t
Net revenue of baseline in year t
$/ha
RC,t
Average
farm
area
Ha
A
Farm price of carbon
$/Tc
pF
Rental
price
of
carbon
$/tC
pC
Purchase price of CER
$/tCO2e
pCER
Price of labour
$/pd
PL
Number of participating farms
Farms
N
Buyer discount rate
(%)
δB
Seller discount rate
(%)
δS
a
Yield
of
product
j
in
year
t
units/ha
yj,t
Price of product j
$/unit a
pj
quantity of input i in year t
units/ha b
xi,t
cost of input i
$/unit b
cj
Total Buyer’s transaction costs in year t
$
Qt
Total
Seller’s
transaction
costs
in
year
t
$
qt
a
3
output units vary (eg kg, t, m ) depending on the type of product
Variable

b

input units vary (eg pd, kg, bag) depending on the type of input

with parameter values α=0.5, β=471.6 and γ=0.0958. These parameter values result in an
average carbon stock of 89.3 tC/ha over the 25-year period of the project. This agroforestry
system will continue to capture carbon after the project ends (Figure 3).

Biomass carbon (tC/ha)

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Year
Figure 3. Simulated biomass carbon trajectory for damar in Sumatra; the hypothetical project duration is
indicated by a dotted line
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Transaction cost assumptions are presented in Table 3. Note that the units of measurement of
these costs vary. In the case of the Buyer, costs can be ex-ante fixed costs ($), annual fixed
costs ($/y), or variable costs dependent on the number of participating farms ($/farm) or on
the size of the project ($/ha/y). In the case of the Seller, costs are expressed in terms of
labour. The original five transaction-cost categories are disaggregated to account for variation
in the units of measurement. The expanded classification is presented under ‘Cost type’
(column 1, Table 3), where number subscripts denote the different cost types. For example,
there are three types of monitoring costs; WM1 ($/ha/y), WM2 ($/y), and WM3 (CER/y).
Table 3 . Transaction cost assumptions in base case

Cost
type

WS1
WS1
WS1
WS1
WS2
WA
WA
WA
WP1
WP2
WP2
WM1
WM2
WM3
WE1
WE2

Activity
Buyer (project manager)
consultation and negotiation
establish baseline and C flows of project for region
design monitoring plan
prepare project design document
design individual farm plans
approval by host government
validate the project proposal (DOE)a
submit to CER Board (Registration fee)
purchase IT infrastructure, establish local office
maintain database/software and administer payments
coordinate field crews, pay salaries
measure C stocks in sample of farmers’ plots
verification and certification of carbon by DOE
adaptation fee
maintain buffer of C
settle disputes

Cost

Units

20,000
20,000
5,000
6,500
200
1,000
6,000
*
20,000
10,000
40,000
8
10,000
0.02
0.10
100

$
$
$
$
$/farm
$
$
$
$
$/y
$/y
$/ha/y
$/y
CERs/y
CERs/y
$/farm/y

Sellers (farmers)
6
attend information sessions
d
10
undertake training
d
4
design farm plan
d
4
obtain permission to participate in project
d
5
attend regular project meetings
d/y
3
measure trees and report results to project office
d/ha/y
10
protect plot from poachers and fire
d/y
2
participate in dispute resolution
d/y
* Registration fees vary with project size <15,000 CERs=$5,000; 15,000 to <50,000 CERs=$10,000; 50,000 to
<100,000 CERs=$15,000; 100,000 to < 200,000=$20,000; >200,000 CERs = $30,000
a
Designated Operational Entity

wS
wS
wS
wA
wP
wM
wE
wE

Monitoring costs of AR projects can be high, and designing the right monitoring strategy is
important (Cacho, Wise and MacDicken 2004). Monitoring also involves verification and
certification of carbon stocks by a designated operational entity (DOE). This is assumed to
cost $10,000 per year (Table 3), but the cost could be higher if international experts are
required or the project sites are scattered over a large area.
12
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Designing individual farm plans (WS2) involves a technician visiting each farm and drawing a
land-use change plan in consultation with the farmer. This is assumed to cost $200 per farm
to the Buyer, which would include one or two days of a local technician’s time plus travel
expenses. This activity would also take four days of the Seller’s time.
Enforcement and insurance is assumed to involve maintaining a buffer of 10% of biomass
carbon not sold as CERs, plus an average cost of $100 per farm per year to settle disputes;
this expense would include any legal fees involved. The buffer is also a risk-mitigation
strategy to account for leakage or the possible loss of trees.
Using the expanded notation introduced in Table 3, transaction costs can now be calculated
as:
VT = WS 1 + W A + WP1 + nWS 2 +

⎡WP 2 + WM 2 + n(WE 2 + aWM 1 ) + ⎤
−t
⎥ (1 + δ B )
(
)
)
+
−
W
C
C
p
0t
E1
jt
C
⎣ M3
⎦

∑ ⎢(W
t

⎡
−t ⎤
vT = ⎢ wS + wA + ∑ [wP + wE + a wM ](1 + δ S ) ⎥ pL
t
⎣
⎦

(17)

(18)

Assumptions regarding prices and discount rates are presented in Table 4. The price of CERs
is set initially at a high value ($20/t CO2) to ensure the project is feasible.

Table 4. Other assumptions for base case

Variable
pCER
pC
pL
n
a

δB
δS

i

Value
20
4.28
1.72
500
2
0.06
0.15
ln(1+δB)
89.3
0
4,372
4,375

Description
price of CERs ($/t CO2e)
farm price of carbon ($/t C)
price of labour ($/d)
number of farms in project
average area of farm (ha)
Buyer discount rate
Seller discount rate
discount rate in carbon rental market
mean carbon stock (tC/ha) for Damar
mean carbon stock (tC/ha) for Cassava (baseline)
net present value ($/ha) of Damar
net present value ($/ha) of Cassava (baseline)

Replacing equations (4) and (8) with (17) and (18) respectively, and inserting parameter
values in the appropriate equations, we can now solve the model and determine under what
conditions both buyers and sellers will participate in the market; based on conditions for
project participation (1) and (5). Experiments consist of solving the model for different values
of pCER, pF, a and n and determining when both conditions (1) and (5) are satisfied.

13
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A series of computer experiments were performed on the hypothetical project. The model is
built upon the assumption that the project consists of n identical farms each consisting of a
hectares. The project developer establishes individual contracts whereby farmers agree to
change their land use from cropping to agroforestry and receive payments for the carbon
captured in their trees. In designing the project the Buyer decides on the number of
participants (n), the carbon price paid to farmers (pF) and other features such as monitoring
and risk-mitigation strategies.

6. Model Results
A. Determining the Feasible Range for Farm prices

The first step in the numerical analysis is to determine bounds for the farm price. This
involves finding the minimum price acceptable to the Seller (pS) and the maximum price the
Buyer is willing to pay (pB). First, pF is set such that vC −vA=vT and the resulting value is
called pS; then pF is set such that VC −VA=VT and the resulting value is called pB. The project is
feasible only if pB ≥ pS, and the farm price falls within the range pS ≤ pF ≤ pB. The actual value
of pF depends on the market power of the participants, the objectives of the Buyer and the
outcome of negotiations.
(A) Seller
1800
1600

vC-vA

1400

$

1200
1000
800
600

vT

400
200
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

(B) Buyer
4000

$’000

3000

VT
2000

pS

1000

pB

VC -VA

0
0

1

2

3

4

5

Farm price ($/tC)
Figure 4. The feasible range of farm prices within which the project will be feasible is derived by finding
the minimum price acceptable to the Seller in (A) and the maximum price acceptable to the Buyer in (B)

The carbon margin for the Seller (vC-vA in Figure 4A) increases linearly with pF, whereas the
carbon margin for the Buyer (VC-VA in Figure 4B) decreases linearly with pF. The
intersections of the carbon margin curves with their respective transaction cost curves
indicate the price bounds (pS, pB). Given the assumptions in Tables 3 and 4 the feasible farm
price ranges between $0.83/tC and $1.31/tC. For simplicity we now set pF = (pS + pB )/2 as
14
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the base price to determine the effects of other project design variables; therefore pF =
$1.07/tC in the base case.
B. Determining Minimum farm size

In the base case we assume and average farm area of two hectares, this size is consistent with
the average area of land granted to transmigrants in Sumatra (Grist and Menz, 1997). The
assumptions in Table 4 imply that the project covers 1,000 ha (500 farms of 2 ha each) and
increases the biomass carbon stock by 89,300 tC above the baseline. This corresponds to a
total of 327,731 CERs produced by the project (89,300 tC × 3.67 tCO2/tC). Given that we are
dealing with smallholders it is important to determine to what extent the size of participating
farms affects the feasibility of the project. To answer this question we solve the model for a
range of values of a, while simultaneously adjusting n to keep project size constant at 1,000
ha (or 327,731 CERs). This operation does not affect the carbon margin but it has a
significant effect on transaction costs for the Buyer (Figure 5).
As farm size increases the Buyer’s transaction costs decrease at a decreasing rate and become
relatively flat at farm sizes beyond 5 ha or so. Reducing farm size below 1 ha causes
transaction costs to increase exponentially. The minimum farm size for the given parameters
is 1.6 ha, which would require 625 participating farms to maintain total project area at 1,000
ha. At this point the Buyer’s transaction costs would be approximately $2.42 million, which
translates into $7.39/CER. By comparison, for a project with 5-ha farms (requiring 200 farms
to maintain the project area at 1,000ha), the Buyer’s transaction costs would be $1.75M, or
$5.34/CER.
6000

5000

$’000

4000

3000

VC -VA

2000

VT

1000

0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Farm size (ha)
Figure 5. Minimum feasible farm size is indicated by the dotted line at the intersection of the carbon
margin (VC-VA) and the transaction costs (VT) for the Buyer (note: the number of farms decreases as farm
size increases to keep the project size constant at 1000 ha, farm price is $1.07/tC)

C. Determining Minimum number of farms

Now assume that farm size remains constant at 2 ha and the total project area can increase by
increasing the number of contracts with farmers. In this case, as the total project area
increases the farm price the Buyer is prepared to pay (pB) also increases (Figure 6). This is
because, although both the carbon margin (VC-VA) and transaction costs (VT) increase with the
increasing number of participants, the latter increases slower because the fixed cost are spread
15
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among a larger number of participants. The Buyer’s price increases at a decreasing rate, from
$0.81 to $1.91/tC as the number of farms under contract increases from 355 to 1,000; and
total project area increases from 700 ha to 2,000 ha. In Figure 6, the minimum number of
farms (355) is that at which the Buyer’s maximum farm price is the same as the minimum
price acceptable to the Seller (pB = pS).

Buyer (pB)

infeasible

Farm price ($/tC)

2.0

1.5

1.0

Seller (pS)
0.5

0.0
0

200

400

600

800

1000

Number of farms
Figure 6. The breakeven number of farms, indicated by the dotted line, is calculated as the point at which
the maximum price the Buyer is willing to pay (pB) equals the minimum price the Seller is willing to
accept (pS)

D. Effects of CER price

The CER price used above ($20/tCO2e) is rather high given current market conditions, so it is
important to determine how a lower price will affect project feasibility. In particular, it is of
interest to evaluate how the CER price affects the critical values of pS, pB, n and a identified
above. Essentially, this involves changing pCER and repeating the above analysis to identify
the points at which the Buyer’s carbon margin (VC-VA) equals the transaction cost (VT).
Results are presented in Table 5. The middle column of results shows the base case already
discussed, the other two columns are the results with pCER values of $25 and $15. Given the
transaction costs assumed and the default number of farms (500) and farm size (2 ha), a pCER
of $15 is not feasible. At this CER price the Buyer’s price (pB=0.39) is below the Seller price
(pS=0.83). Setting the farm price pF at its lowest feasible value of $0.82/tC, we find that the
minimum farm area with constant project size (1,000 ha) is 3.43 ha. This result (Block A in
Table 5) is represented by downward shift of the VC-VA line in Figure 5 as the CER price
decreases, causing the new intersection with VT to occur at a larger farm size.
The last three rows of Table 5 (the Block labelled B) are the most interesting, because they
show the absolute minimum possible project size (when pF = pS), or the breakeven project
size, rather than the minimum project size with pF arbitrarily set at the mean between Buyer’s
and Seller’s prices. The breakeven number of farms increases from 355 at a pCER of $20 to
772 at a pCER of $15. This shift represents a doubling in project area from 710 ha to 1,544 ha
and is equivalent to an increase in project size (in terms of CERs) from 233 kt CO2e to 506 kt
CO2e.
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Table 5. Effect of CER price on critical values of project-design variables

Price of CERs ($/tCO2e)
25
20
15
0.83
0.83
0.83
2.22
1.31
0.39
1.52
1.07
0.82

Seller minimum carbon price ($/tC), pS
Buyer maximum farm price ($/tC), pB
Farm price ($/tC), pF
A) With project area constant (1000ha):
Minimum farm area (ha)
Corresponding number of farms
Project CERs (tCO2e)

1.18
1.61
3.43
846
622
291
327,891 327,891 327,891

B) With farm size constant (2ha) and pF=pS:
Breakeven number of farms
Corresponding project area (ha)
Project CERs (tCO2e)

230
355
772
460
709
1,544
150,875 232,552 506,250

To put our results in perspective consider that, in May 2006, there were 176 CDM projects
registered5, claiming to reduce emissions by an average of 301,633 tCO2e/y. Classified by
size, there were 71 large-scale projects with average emission reductions of 638,133 tCO2e/y
and 78 small-scale projects claiming an average of 29,554 tCO2e/y. To convert our results
from stocks of carbon to flows of CO2 and compare them to existing projects, note that the
aboveground biomass carbon stock of the damar system is assumed to increase from 0 to 252
tC/ha in 25 years (Figure 3); this represents an annual CO2 reduction of 37 tonnes
(3.67×252/25); multiplying this value by the breakeven project areas in Table 5 we obtain
17,020 tCO2/y, 26,233 tCO2/y and 57,128 tCO2/y for CER prices of $25, $20 and $15
respectively. So our hypothetical project may fit within the small-scale category at a CER
price of $20 or above.

7. The Project Feasibility Frontier and Sensitivity Analysis
We have seen above that smaller projects become feasible as the CER price increases. Often,
it is convenient to express project size in terms of total CERs rather than number of farms, as
this allows comparison with other projects, including those in the energy sector. Figure 7
shows how the minimum project size (in terms of CERs) decreases as the CER price
increases. This curve forms a frontier, because projects falling below or to the left of this
curve are not feasible under the given transaction costs, whereas projects that fall above or to
the right of the frontier are feasible. We will call this curve the project feasibility frontier
(PFF).

5

http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html
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Figure 7. The project feasibility frontier (PFF)

In essence the PFF is the set of points at which the carbon margins just cover the transaction
costs for both parties. The breakeven value of n is then converted to CER units with the
formula:
Project CERs = n × a (ha) × 89.3 (tC/ha) × 3.67 (tCO2/tC).
The PFF is a convenient way of exploring the influence of land productivity, individual
transaction costs, or any other exogenous variable on the viability of a project. A new PFF
can be derived by changing any exogenous variable and repeating the process; thus providing
a useful tool for sensitivity analysis.
A. Effect of carbon sequestration potential

The damar system in our project is assumed to increase average carbon stock by 89.3 tonnes
per hectare over the life of the project (25 years). But there can be considerable variability in
the productivity of farms within the same region. Therefore it is important to determine the
influence of carbon-sequestration potential on project viability. Figure 8 presents PFFs for
three levels of carbon sequestration potential: the base case, a low potential (0.75 C(t)), and a
high potential (1.25 C(t)).
A change in carbon sequestration potential causes the PFF to shift in the opposite direction.
When C(t) increases by 25% the PFF shifts left, so that, compared to the base case, smaller
projects are viable at a given CER price; or lower CER prices are required to make a given
project size viable. A decrease in C(t) has the opposite effect, and the effect is more
pronounced. These results indicate that a reduction in actual carbon sequestered relative to
expectations can have a major influence on the success of the project.
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Figure 8. The effect of carbon sequestration potential on the position of the project feasibility frontier; the
dotted line represents the base case, solid lines represent an increase (to 1.25×base) or a decrease (to
0.75×base) in the carbon-stock trajectory

B. Effect of Transaction costs

The transaction costs assumed for this analysis were presented in Table 3. These values are
arbitrary but plausible. There is high uncertainty regarding some of these costs and thus it is
important to evaluate their effect on project viability. This can be done by modifying the
Seller’s transaction costs, q(t), and/or the Buyer’s transaction costs, Q(t), and solving the
model. Figure 9 presents PFFs for three transaction-cost scenarios: the base case, low Buyer
cost (0.75 Q(t)), and a low Seller cost (0.75 q(t)).
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Figure 9. The effect of transaction costs on the position of the project feasibility frontier; the dotted line
represents the base case, the solid lines represent a 25% decrease in the transaction costs of the Buyer (Qt)
or Seller (qt)

Decreases in transaction costs cause the PFF to shift left, making smaller projects viable at a
given CER price; or lowering the CER price required to make a given project size viable.
Buyer’s transaction costs have a more pronounced influence than Seller’s transaction costs.
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So reducing the transaction costs experienced by buyers should be a priority when designing
projects, which is the subject we turn to in the following section.

8. Discussion: potential for improving the feasibility of smallholder carbon
projects and future research
A. Potential for Reducing Transactions Costs

The model results indicate that reducing transactions costs is an important means to increase
the feasibility of smallholder participation in carbon markets. In this section we outline some
strategies by which these costs can be reduced, and the role of the public sector in facilitating
them.
The biggest gains in improving the feasibility of smallholder carbon sequestration projects
may be realized by reducing the ex-ante transactions costs the buyers face. Reducing fixed
costs may be expected to have greater benefits for smallholder participation, since these are
shared over the total number of hectares in the project. Strategies to reduce these types of
transactions costs fall into three broad categories: 1) Increasing project size by
fostering/building upon collective action amongst suppliers; 2) reducing contracting costs by
utilizing existing management structures; and 3) reducing information costs through public
provision of data, templates and guidelines. The categories are not mutually exclusive and in
fact in many cases are complementary.
Foster collective action. Coordinating and consolidating sequestration supply among groups
of poor landholders is an important way to reduce transaction costs associated with
smallholder projects and one which has received considerable attention in the literature.
(Lipper and Cavatassi 2004; Cacho et. al. 2003; Smith and Scherr 2002; Landell-Mills and
Porras 2002) Examples of projects involving smallholder coordination in the supply of
carbon services are described in Cacho et. 2003, Smith and Scherr 2002 and Orlando et. al.
2002. In these projects the costs to buyers of identifying, contracting, and enforcing viable
carbon sequestration opportunities among smallholders are reduced through the presence of
an intermediary representing the suppliers, which can be an NGO, community group or
government agency. It is important to note however, that the transactions cost facing the
sellers can increase by participating in such group schemes, and this cost must be lower than
the benefits that sellers derive from participation. Several of the existing carbon smallholder
projects were built upon some type of existing community projects, such as ongoing
community-based natural resource management projects, particularly community forestry
projects or farmer’s groups. For example, the Scolel Te project was initiated with a
stakeholder group of interested farmers drawn mainly from one farmers union operating in
the Chiapas region. ( http://www.eccm.uk.com/scolelte/involved.html). Communities that
already have experience in working cooperatively are likely to have lower costs of
participation as well as dispute resolution – another important transaction cost.

One potentially important area for collective action to reduce transactions costs is through
peer-monitoring schemes. There is anecdotal evidence that, when farmers learn the value of
carbon biomass, they could monitor their plots at low cost. For example, farmers in Sumatra
are able to assess the volume of wood in their trees by sight; they are accurate within the 0.25
m3 increments used in the timber market (Hairia et al. 2001). In field tests undertaken by
Delaney and Roshetko (1999), two days were required for a crew to learn inventory methods
20
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for measuring carbon in agroforestry gardens in Java. This evidence suggests that training
smallholders to identify and measure their own trees or participate in a peer monitoring
scheme may be a good investment, since monitoring costs are a fairly significant recurring
transaction cost. In addition self or peer monitoring systems have the potential to yield more
accurate carbon assessments, because the accuracy of carbon measurements depends on the
number of sampling sites (e.g. see Cacho et al., 2004). Therefore involving smallholders in
self-monitoring could not only reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, but also achieve
high measurement accuracy by allowing high sampling intensity at a fairly low cost.
Utilize existing infrastructure/management capacity. Transactions costs associated with
establishing local offices, purchasing IT infrastructure, maintain database/software and
administer payments could be greatly reduced where carbon projects are implemented by
existing public or private entities that already have some or all of the infrastructure and
management capacity in place. Another potentially important management structure to build
upon is conditional cash transfer mechanisms that various countries and local governments
are involved in implementing. (See de la Briere and Rawlings 2006 for a summary) These
programs have been implemented in a wide range of middle and low income developing
countries and they involve linking cash payments to behaviour modification – usually in the
area of education and health. Important management lessons as well as the potential to use
existing payment infrastructure can be obtained from these programs and make a significant
reduction in fixed transactions costs facing small-scale sequestration projects.
Reducing information costs. Generating and disseminating information is one of the largest
source of transactions costs in carbon projects: including the establishment of baselines,
methodologies for implementation and monitoring, as well information on buyers and sellers
to reduce search costs. At this point the carbon market is still quite young, so information
costs are high as a set of rules, methodologies and baseline datasets are currently under
development. For example, the establishment of carbon baselines is one of the most
expensive ex ante transactions costs, and the generation and dissemination of information by
development agencies can have a considerable effect in reducing transaction costs. The Good
Practice Guides of the IPCC and associated tools have reduced the cost of developing project
documents, in particular those for small scale projects, which allow generic parameters to be
used to estimate carbon stocks of project activities. Another important aspect of reducing
information costs is the development of a set of rules and methodologies specific to small
scale projects. Under the CDM small-scale projects are allowed to adapt a simplified set of
procedures including a simplified PDD. Haites (2004) states:
“The simplified methodologies adopted by the Executive Board for small-scale CDM projects appear to reduce
the transaction costs for those projects enough to make such projects economically viable. Evidence as to
whether the transaction cost per CER is higher or lower than for a regular CDM project is mixed. But indications
of a supply of potential small-scale CDM projects suggest that the transaction costs for the simplified
methodologies are sufficiently low to make some small projects economically viable at the current market price
for Kyoto units”.

This statement refers to projects in the energy sector which tend to be easier to monitor. It is
not clear whether the same applies to AR projects. To test whether this is true the model can
be solved using values representing the simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale
CDM projects. Therefore it is important to obtain cost estimates for such projects for future
analyses.
Several efforts are underway to reduce buyer and seller search and negotiation costs –
including the establishment of websites such as the Ecosystem marketplace
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(www.ecosystemmarketplace.com) as well as websites, workshops, publications, technical
projects, research activities and capacity building work on the part of several UN agencies
and NGOS including FAO, GEF, UNEP, WWF, IUCN, TNC and others.
B. Future Extensions to the Model

The analytical tools developed in this study can be applied to address a rich variety of
questions with relevance to policy makers and project developers. Some interesting questions
that are not answered here, but that could be tackled by applying the model, are discussed in
this section.
We assumed that carbon stocks are measured, verified and certified, and the new batch of
CERs is submitted every year, thus supplying the project with an annual income stream.
Similarly, participating farmers receive annual payments in proportion to the stock of carbon
they maintained during the year. Variations on these schedules are possible. For example, the
project may certify and sell temporary CERs every five years, thus reducing monitoring and
certification costs, but also delaying the receipt of payments and therefore increasing the need
for credit.
Variations on the schedule of payments to farmers are also possible. For example, the project
could provide a larger initial payment, to help farmers cover the expense of establishing
agroforestry in their land, followed by smaller future payments. The payment schedule would
be designed so that the present value of the total payment is the same as it would have been
with annual payments. The Fondo Bioclimatico carbon project in Mexico offers an example
of this approach. In their first year of participation, farmers receive an upfront payment
equivalent to 20% of the total amount to be accrued over 20 to 30 years. Three more
payments of 20% are made in years 2, 3 and 5, and the final payment is made in year 10
(Corbera 2005). This strategy requires the project developer to take on more risk because
initial payments exceed the value of the carbon already sequestered, and this money would be
lost should farmers abandon the project. However, the strategy also raises interesting
possibilities. Since the Seller’s discount rate is higher than the Buyer’s, the project developer
can increase the present value of payments to farmers, while keeping the present value of the
project cost constant; thus providing higher incentives to farmers with no additional cost
(although with some additional risk).
In our analysis we assume that all participating farmers join the project in its first year, and
that the number of participants remains constant throughout the project. In reality, the project
may start with a few farmers and, if it is successful, grow as other farmers apply to join once
they observe the advantages of participation. The Fondo Bioclimatico provides an example of
this evolution (Corbera 2005). The project started in 1997 with 6 communities, 43 contracts
and covering 77.5 ha. By 2004 the project had 33 communities, 650 contracts and covered
845 ha. As the project has grown and fixed costs have been absorbed it has become feasible
to allow smaller farms to participate.
Our analysis assumes that smallholders are price-takers in a homogenous carbon market,
however there is the potential to develop a “premium” product in the form of CERs that are
certified for not only carbon but also sustainable development and poverty reduction. This is
the concept behind the “gold standard certification for CERS that has been developed by an
NGO ” http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/. Gold standard claims that their certification often
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leads to projects obtaining premium prices for CERs. One important question in the
development of these types of niche markets is the relative size of the additional transactions
costs associated with obtaining certification as compared with the price premium obtained,
and the overall effects on project feasibility taking into account all other relevant parameters.
We have assumed that farms participating in a project are homogeneous. This simplifies the
analysis by allowing us to calculate transaction costs, abatements costs and carbon payments
for the average farm, and then multiply the results by the number of farms to obtain projectlevel results. This simplification also makes it computationally feasible to derive the projectfeasibility frontier (PFF) for a large number of scenarios, thus helping us understand the
influence of different types of transaction costs and other assumptions on the feasibility of a
project. In deriving the PFF we implicitly assume that there are as many farms of a given area
as needed by the project to cover transaction costs. In reality, a limited number of farms is
available in a region and, furthermore, there can be considerable variability between farms in
terms of size and productive capacity. Antle and Valdivia (2006) observed this variability in
US agriculture and pointed out that it may have important implications for policy analysis of
payments for environmental services.
Finally, the baseline is another factor that can have significant influence on project viability,
in terms of both opportunity cost and expected carbon stocks in the absence of the project.
Our evidence suggests that the best strategy for achieving success is to concentrate on
degraded lands that have low opportunity cost and low carbon stocks.
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